Author: Mohamed Sahnoun
Reviewed by Elmi Samatar
This book was written by Mohamed Sahnoun of Algeria who was appointed by UN Secretary-General (UNSRG) Boutros Boutros Ghali of Egypt to Somalia on 28 April 1992 to facilitate UN’s search for peace and stability and to help the millions of people under starvation throughout the country. In his book, the author used clear and convincing language and the main intent behind the book are well defined. The author employed an authentic first-hand source and exposed extraordinary challenges he believed where mainly coming from his bureaucratic office in New York and other key mission partners. The first publication was made in 1994 by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in Washington.
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Right after his appointment to the post, Mr. Sahnoun was able to reach out all warring sides persuading them to solve their differences in a peaceful manner and advised them to refrain hindering aid delivery while it jeopardizes the already exacerbating humanitarian situations on the ground. He also instructed his subordinates and humanitarian counterparts to act swiftly and distribute thousands of metric tons of food to the most affected areas and save many lives otherwise, the situation will continue to deteriorate due to the faction leaders that would contest the management of the limited resources. Obviously, it was clear that Mr. Sahnoun was experiencing at that time intermittent access to the bureaucratic UN office in New York that many times hesitated to take seriously the recommendations and other key decisions that Mr. Sahnoun considered to be important and that would facilitate his mission in Somalia.
Prior his appointment to the UN Special Representative (UNSR) to Somalia, he led a fact-finding mission that UNSRG Boutros requested and after he assessed the plight engulfed to the Somali people, he unswervingly criticized the UN and the International Community for deserting and desolating Somalia for such long time after the oust of Siad Barre. It was the author’s belief that if the International Community had intervened earlier, much of the catastrophe that has unfolded could have been avoided. The Somali government that failed to resist the SNM advancement in northern regions reacted heavy weapons and aircraft to repress the civilian and in May alone 1988, an estimated of 5,000 civilian members of the Isaaq clan were killed. It was the responsibility of the UN, intergovernmental organizations and the international community to take actions and this represents the first missed opportunity.
It was not only the UN’s procrastination and its agencies but neglect and watching Somalia descending into terrible situations that resulted in thousands of people to die and left many starving people in destitute. The United Nations agencies, other few NGOs and the international community were proclaimed to the world that they were involved in one or another way due to their presence on the ground and their limited response to the calamity that inflicted to the Somali people. In addition to that, the UN agencies made tremendous pledges and immediate responses to the situations as was done in Biafra and Ethiopia 1960s and 1980s respectively hence they were very reluctant to organize massive relief operations in Somalia.
After the government bombarded the northern regions and fiercely reacted other insurgents fighting along the Ethiopian border and many people linked to the uprising movements are arrested indiscriminately in Mogadishu, a manifesto calling for national reconciliation was formed in Mogadishu in May 1990. The manifesto signatories were 144 intellectuals, businessmen, moderate political leaders and officials from the government. In a broad daylight, the manifesto group dared to blame the atrocities committed by the government forces and called national reconciliation conference, multiparty system, and constitutional change.
The Manifesto team had every reason to fear for their lives after they criticized and denounced the government saying “what has the government did in northern regions is an affront move to its citizens.” For the sake of the national safety and bringing an end to the uprising, the Manifest group nominated a thirteen-person committee headed by Somalia’s first president, Adam Abdullahi Osman, and Somalia’s second Parliament speaker, Sheik Mukhtar Mohamed Hussein to lead the reconciliation initiative. This was a golden opportunity that Somali government missed using the Manifesto team that comprised the most influential individuals in the country and instead of taking that positive move, the government arrest former president Adam Abdullahi Osman and other key Manifesto signatories and others fled the country fearing for their safety. The fulmination and the arrest of Manifesto contingent instead of listening to their advises represents the second missed opportunity.
On 26 January 1991, some Manifesto leaders ally to Ali Mahdi appointed him as Somali interim president just one day before Siad Barre fled from Mogadishu and promptly his rival chief Mohamed Farah Aided boycotted the appointment. The author also highlighted that Ali’s government invited all faction leaders to national reconciliation at least two times which was not fruitful.
In July and August 1991, the Djibouti government attempted to hold serious reconciliation efforts to the Somali people with the support of some regional governments after the UN refused without explanation to take part the efforts. Soon after the negotiation commenced in Djibouti, the meeting had failed and among those problems that hampered are; the delegates to the meeting had only limited to control of the forces on the ground, the conference attended by only some regions and finally, the delegates were unwilling to sit the political part of Siad Barre’s clan. After the failure of this conference, severe fighting between the United Somali Congress (USC) factions broke out on 17th November 1991 and instantly spread to other regions including areas controlled by Somali National Movement (SNM) in the northern regions of Somalia.
For the month of March in 1992, above 30,000 died hunger and hunger-related diseases and above 500,000 were without basic services while more than 3,000 mostly women, children and old men were dying daily due to starvation. Despite the civil war that has erupted, the two-year-old drought has further compounded and the clan-based conflict spread in the rural areas that have had bad implications to the agriculture and livestock and hundreds of thousands of lives had already been lost when the international community started to respond. In early 1992, SOS was the only hospital in Mogadishu that was functioning and other very few NGOs including ICRC were able to maintain their presence.
Therefore, if the international community could have assisted the Djibouti government initiatives of bringing together warring parties in Djibouti, much of the catastrophe could have been avoided and this represents the third missed opportunity.
When the UN adopted its third resolution on 24thApril 1992 on Somalia and appointed the UN special representative to Somalia on 28thApril 1992, great hopes were raised and the preceding resolution established the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). When the announcement has been made, it created jubilation, but the Somali people do not comprehend why the UN and world community had kept distance when the Somali people need them most.
The representative’s argument was breaking the vicious conflict and the food scarcity and restore the most important social services including but not limited to; communication, water, electricity, transport, and health services. The representative’s plea to the NGOs and international communities to maintain their offices in Somalia instead of preferring to remain in Djibouti or Nairobi in order they afford to deliver extra relief efforts has been disappointing and already over one million children’s lives were at risk. Although ICRC, WFP, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, and other international NGO and countries started to bring thousands of MT of foods, there were massive banditry and looting that hindered the effective aid delivery and the UNOSOM team had proposed to divide Somalia into four zones for easing the operations (Berbera, Bosaso, Mogadishu & Kismayo).
One of the critical moments of the UNOSOM team is that they have learned a Russian plane chartered by a UN agency carrying currency and military equipment landed northern Mogadishu several times to extend support to the interim president. The UNOSOM team protested against those agencies and individuals involved in the incidents and diverted the mission objectives and demanded investigation while nothing has been done in the investigation. The Somali people questioned the impartiality of the UN and alleged them fueling the war.
While the UNSR is facing all the above challenges, Mr. Boutros Ghali told Sahnoun that the USA militarily intends to intervene in Somalia. Then, Mr. Sahnoun announced his idea about the decision that has been made and vehemently protested against the move saying “The intervention will turn to disaster” and then resigned from his position as UN Special Representative to Somalia. The UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros Ghali appointed Mr. Ismat Kittani of Iraq to be his Special Representative to Somalia on 3rdNovember 1992 to replace Mr. Sahnoun who had resigned in his tenure.
The book has many insights and I recommend to everyone who is in the research industry or interesting to understand why many journalists described Somalia as hell or want to know more about why Somalia and many other similar countries descended into terrible civil war and prolonged social unrest.
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